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ABSTRACT: In order to understand the predicament facing Africa today, one has 
to return to a previous era when Africa faced its ight against colonalization. One 
hundred and twenty- ive years after the Berlin Conference, a vast majority of African 
states remain in a position of social and political stagnation. Decolonization, which 
was supposedly based on the positive-sum incorporation of the newly-independent 
states into the international political arena, led to the dissolution of the rhetoric of 
“civilizing the barbaric masses”; and a new global endeavor emerged to “develop” 
the post-colonial state via its access to the absolute gains of the global political 
economy. For the majority of populaces of the Third World, however, the promises of 
social security, economic advancement, equal terms of trade, and the abandonment 
of force and racism did not shadow the decolonization process. In this context, Franz 
Fanon said that there is nothing save a minimum of re-adaptation, a few reforms at 
the top, a lag waving, and down at the bottom an undivided mass still living in the 
middle ages, endlessly marking time. 
KEY WORDS: Africa today, decolonization, socio-economic and political 
development, and thesis of Franz Fanon.
INTRODUCTION
As the global economy enters the second decade of the 21st century, 
world leaders are still grappling with the aftermath of the international 
credit crisis. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a consensus has built 
around the issue that self-regulating unfettered markets are not the 
cornucopia that liberal economists would have us believe. Globalization 
may have produced spectacular growth, but in doing so it has also created 
abject poverty in many parts of the world, none more so than in Africa.   
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In order to understand the predicament facing Africa today, one has to 
return to a previous era when Africa faced its ight against colonalization. 
Writing at the time, Franz Fanon described the colonial system as two 
worlds following the dictates of mutual exclusion: 
The colonist’s sector is a sector built to last, all stone and steel. It’s a sector of 
lights and paved roads, where the trash cans constantly over low with strange and 
wonderful garbage, undreamed-of leftovers. The colonist’s feet […] are protected 
by solid shoes in a sector where the streets are clean and smooth, without a 
pothole, without a stone. The colonist’s sector is a sated, sluggish sector, its belly 
full of good things […]. The colonized sector, or at least the “native” quarters, 
the shanty town, the Medina, the reservation, is a disreputable place inhabited 
by disrespected people […]. It’s a world with no space, people are piled one on 
top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together. The colonized’s sector is 
a famished sector, hungry for bread, meat, shoes, coal, and light. The colonized’s 
sector is a sector that crouches and cowers, a sector on its knees, a sector that is 
prostrate (Fanon, 1963:4). 
Africa may have thrown the colonists out, but the continent still remains 
caught in the headlights of a global economic system that perpetuates 
these two worlds of glut and want, a world where new demands are being 
made in the name of the market. Fifty years after Franz Fanon wrote his 
lines, fund managers of Emerging Capital, a private equity company could 
announce: “Africa is once again open for business” (Weintstein, 2008:4). 
This followed the allocation of $523 million that the company had raised to 
invest in Africa. This company, however, was not unique in its endeavours. 
The rise in oil and raw material prices had sparked a notable increase 
in foreign investment, and by the end of 2007, FDI lows to Sub-Saharan 
Africa had reached a record level of more than $30 billion (Cotula et al., 
2009:25).
THE LAND OF AFRICA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
As early as 1999, UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development) reported: “The potential for highly pro itable foreign 
investment in Africa is enormous” (UNCTAD, 2009). It had in fact been 
higher than in most other regions. In Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: 
Performance and Potential, United Nations Secretary-General, Ko i Annan, 
urged African leaders to change the “negative image [that was based] in wars 
and economic dif iculties that af lict[ed] some countries”, by opening up 
and attracting foreign investment into the resource-rich continent (Harsch, 
1999:26). In the years that followed, many African countries implemented 
notable policy reforms, guided by the principles of neo-liberalism. In many 
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of these countries, the new liberal conditions brought with them increased 
growth and greater economic stability. The success of these countries led 
UNCTAD to conclude that FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) has a signi icant 
developmental impact on developing countries (Harsch, 1999:26). As a 
result, foreign investment gained enormous political clout, premised on 
the idea that it was “helping Africans help themselves” (Parris, 2008).
The reality of FDI then and now is that its effects differ vastly between 
nation states. As Sub-Saharan Africa became “the playground of neo-
liberalism”, some nations emerged as dynamic “frontrunners”, while others 
saw little or no developmental consequence (Weintstein, 2008:3). The 
uneven results suggested that successful policy demanded more than just 
outward-oriented ef iciency. In fact, the “frontrunners” of the 20th century 
(Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and Namibia, amongst others) shared 
several features: “stable and predictable macroeconomic environments, 
higher GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth rates, a relatively well-
developed infrastructure, and efforts to improve the education levels and 
skills of their people” (Harsch, 1999:26). It was the latter – the focus on 
building up a stock of human capital – that most markedly distinguished 
the “winners” in the race to attract FDI. 
The UNCTAD report explains that since natural resources are among 
the key determinants for attracting foreign investment, strategic policy is 
vital to ensure sustainability over time, and thereby combat the so-called 
“resource curse”. Successful nations “have therefore used revenues derived 
from the extraction of these resources to fund the creation of other assets” 
– for example, in Botswana, revenues from the mining sector have been 
tactically invested to build up human capital – and thus make the country 
attractive to even more investment (Annan, 1999:25).
Their stories suggest that favourable economic environments for FDI, as 
in the African frontrunners, involve a measure of state-led “compensation” 
to secure human capital and sustainable growth. In countries without such 
hybrid policies, the effect of increased FDI may not have the same positive-
sum results. More troublingly, as L. Weintstein purports, rapid and unbridled 
liberalisation in some parts of the continent is actually “turning Africa into a 
one-way conveyor belt of raw materials” (Weintstein, 2008:7).
The agriculture sector, in particular, has been an area of increased 
attention and much dissonance over the last few decades. The attractiveness 
of farmland in Africa is twofold: irst, it is highly fertile in numerous regions; 
and second, it is incredibly inexpensive. These ideal investment conditions 
have led to the growing privatization of arable land, usually by foreign 
irms. In ive of the most popular destinations for FDI – Sudan, Ethiopia, 
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Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania – national inventories record a 
staggering 2,492,684 hectares of land allocated for agricultural investment, 
with thousands of hectares unreported and even more pending (Cotula et 
al., 2009:41). In the years since 2004, and particularly in the wake of the 
global economic crisis, “investment funds have recently begun applying the 
most basic formula in the world: Man must eat” (Knaup & von Mittelstaedt, 
2009; and http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,639224,00.
html, 7/9/2009).
ON THE LAND ACQUISITIONS 
One of the major motivations behind the growing number of land 
acquisitions is the issue of food security. The global population is expected 
to reach nine billion by 2050 and already, food production is struggling to 
keep up with rising demand (Biney, 2009; and http://www.africa iles.org/
article.asp?ID=21803, 10/10/2009). In addition, increasing urbanisation 
means that a greater share of the global population is beginning to depend 
on food purchases. Roughly 60 percent of the global demand comes from 
nations that are dependent on imports for their food (Cotula et al., 2009:53). 
For these net food-importers (particularly nations like the Gulf States, 
which are oil-rich but essentially desert), Africa’s fertile land is hugely 
appealing. Though many wealthy nations (South Korea, for example) can 
easily afford to import food, the uncertainty of the global markets makes 
land acquisitions pivotal for securing food supplies for their own people. 
More recently, government consumption targets for biofuels have also 
been a driving force behind foreign agricultural investment. Though this 
type of investment is generally said to be premised on environmental 
concerns, it is likely, too, that energy security has played an important 
role. Volatility in the oil price over the last few years has led nations to 
pursue alternative energy sources for long-term sustainability. Additionally, 
projections of dwindling supplies of non-renewable energy sources have led 
nations to pursue biofuel expansion. Importantly, some biofuel feedstocks 
like bioethanol or biodiesel compete for land use with staple foods, thereby 
further increasing the food price. The change in land use exacerbates the 
problem of food security, but as yet, this has not tempered the rate of land 
acquisitions; in fact, quite the opposite. 
The rhetoric of foreign investors is rife with claims about “ ighting 
hunger” and it may be true that agricultural investment is driven by food 
security and sustainable energy concerns. At the heart of this FDI, however, 
lies a simple incentive: investors are hungry for pro its. With the prices 
of agricultural commodities rising rapidly, and the relative inelasticity 
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of staple foodstuffs, agribusiness is becoming increasingly attractive to 
foreign irms. This competitive acquisition of land by the private sector 
is driven by consideration of food prices in the short run, but more 
speci ically by expectations of high returns in the long run. Investors across 
the world refer to Africa as the “alpha country” – where alpha denotes 
an investment for which returns exceed risks. Africa’s pro itability has 
spurred an international race to secure its fertile land; a “game of real-life 
monopoly” (Knaup & von Mittelstaedt, 2009; and http://www.spiegel.de/
international/world/0,1518,639224,00.html, 7/9/2009).
The evidence is plentiful. In 2008, a Chinese businessman secured 
10,000 hectares of land in Cameroon for rice production (Grain, 2008; 
and http://www.grain.org/brie ings/?id=212, 10/9/2009). Later that 
same year, three Gulf irms created an Islamic investment fund, AgriCapital 
worth $1 billion, which purchased land internationally to produce food 
for the desert region, as well as to fund research in biotechnology (Grain, 
2008; and http://www.grain.org/brie ings/?id=212, 10/9/2009). At 
the same time, the Saudi Ambassador to Brazil was actively launching a 
joint agribusiness venture, “in which Brazil [would] provide the land and 
know-how, Saudi Arabia the capital and Singapore the logistics” (Grain, 
2008; and http://www.grain.org/brie ings/?id=212, 10/9/2009). And in 
Mozambique, joint partnerships were being negotiated with the Chinese 
government to develop rice production, while investments were being 
made in infrastructure, research, and training (Grain, 2008; and http://
www.grain.org/brie ings/?id=212, 10/9/2009). Further speci ic examples, 
include GEM Biofuels’ 50 year lease of 450,000 ha in Madagascar, UK Energy 
Firm CAMS Group’s 45,000 ha lease in Tanzania, Varun Agriculture SARL’s 
lease of 170,000 ha in Mozambique, and US Based Jarch Capital’s land 
acquisition in southern Sudan (Cotula et al., 2009:38).
These cases, and many others, are examples of FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment) that stand to create a “win-win” situation for source and host 
country alike, offering joint projects that could develop human capital, 
transfer technology, and provide signi icant opportunities for growth and 
pro itability. On face value these developments seem very promising for 
African nations which previously lacked any considerable comparative 
advantage in terms of international economic competitiveness. In addition 
to much needed FDI, the possible positive spillovers include increased 
infrastructural development, job creation, exposure to new technologies, 
and an increased standard of living for local communities. However, 
within the context of Africa’s all but absent institutional framework, such 
investments may be ruinous in nature. In several countries, the effects 
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of liberal reform have been distressing. Large-scale acquisitions can 
(and often do) result in the local population being dispossessed of their 
land and in their losing access to resources that are crucial for their food 
security and their livelihoods (Weintstein, 2008:10). In a 2008 report, 
Grain warns that there is a real risk of both the food and the pro its from 
these agricultural projects “being siphoned off to other countries”, and 
that they may not necessarily bring “development” to local communities 
(Grain, 2008; and http://www.grain.org/brie ings/?id=212, 10/9/2009). 
Even more worryingly, intensive farming may have widespread ecological 
rami ications (Weintstein, 2008:4). 
A lack of a credible institutional framework in fact forms the point of 
departure for the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization’s 
(FAO) report on African land deals. Yes, Africa’s land remains cheap, 
relatively speaking, and there is a perceived abundance. Nevertheless, 
despite the prospects of positive spillovers and new FDI, institutional 
and legal mechanisms remain paramount in securing the rewards of 
investor commitments. In their absence the question remains whether 
costs and bene its are fully acknowledged, or whether political expediency 
and desperation for FDI takes precedence over the public interest and 
sustainability. According to the FAO’s report, many African states have 
been reluctant to accumulate the value of these land deals in terms of land 
fees, and have instead placed added emphasis and value on the monetary 
spillovers of investment levels, employment creation, and infrastructure 
development. The lack of institutional capacity, however, entails that these 
“commitments tend to lack teeth in the overall structure of documented 
land deals” (Cotula et al., 2009:16).
Laws and procedures are also extremely important in assessing the full 
impact of land acquisitions, as well as incorporating civil society – an area in 
which many African states lack competency. For example, can African states 
effectively analyze the degree to which land acquisitions will impact upon 
local producers and communities who depend on subsistence agriculture 
for domestic food security and general livelihood? Can African states assess 
contracts and business models that embody the myriad issues related to 
these acquisitions? The dynamics include the impact and displacement 
of local subsistence farmers (especially if future production is likely to 
be capital intensive), the environmental impact, and even the degree to 
which acquisitions affect the cultural and traditional signi icance of the 
land itself. In addition, use rights, registration procedures, compensation 
requirements, and productive use legislation must all be present to fully 
protect the local communities from negative externalities. 
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Perhaps most importantly, transparency and checks and balances are 
crucial in preventing corruption and money laundering that sabotage 
the public interest. In light of Africa’s historical development and the 
institutional complexity of these deals, it is not surprising that the FAO 
found that approximately all contracts tended to be “short and simple 
compared to the economic reality of the transaction” (Cotula et al., 2009:7). 
Devinder Sharma of the Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security 
recently stated that as foreign countries move to control production and 
secure food imports, the “outsourcing of food production will ensure food 
security for investing countries but will leave behind a trail of hunger, 
starvation and food scarcities for local populations” (Sharma, 2009; and 
http://farmlandgrab.org/5819, 13/7/2009). This is particularly pertinent 
given the long term nature of these land leases. Fifty – and even 99 – year 
land leases are likely to be both politically and socially unsustainable unless 
local welfare is guaranteed (Cotula et al., 2009:8). Within the contextual 
environment of abject poverty, increased population growth and density, 
famine, water scarcity, and environmental degradation, one can only but 
speculate to the degree to which these investments may inevitably impact 
upon Africa’s already volatile socio-political climate. 
This anomaly has been lagged. Championed by the Japanese government, 
the land-investment issue emerged at the G-8 Summit in L`Aquila, as the 
group proposed the introduction of a code of conduct for land deals, so as 
to secure the rights of local communities. The problem remains insidious, 
however, due to a lack of information regarding these deals, their potential 
fallout in recipient countries, and the inevitable limit to which foreign 
governments can promote socially responsible investment within Africa’s 
political environment. This makes the drafting of any code a dif icult and 
potentially unenforceable procedure. 
The recent developments surrounding the foreign purchase of land 
in Africa thus seem to fall within a general pattern of practice that has 
resulted in the increased economic marginalization of certain nations 
within post-colonial Africa. In an era of globalization, the only way where 
developing countries can narrow the gap between the North and the South 
is by harnessing the opportunities created by an open world economy. 
In theory, trade helps produce rapid growth, and rapid growth helps the 
poor by providing more employment, generating resources that can be 
used for anti-poverty programs, and by improving the access of poor 
families to public services such as education and health (Panagariya, 2003). 
Theories, however, which envision such a neat sharing of the bene its 
of trade presuppose some degree of equality between trading partners, 
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some degree of stability in the prices of traded goods, and an ef icient and 
perfectly operating market. 
Unfortunately, in the real world, these conditions do not hold, and the 
reality of what free trade means for developing countries is often a lot 
nastier than it looks in an economics textbook. For a start, economists 
are still unsure about what really causes growth. On their own admission, 
not enough is understood about it to claim that it is even partially caused 
by trade liberalization. While it is possible to show that open economies 
generally do better than closed ones, the primary factors underlying 
economic success are dif icult to identify. In other words, economists are 
not sure whether richer countries have opened up to trade because their 
economies are strong enough to operate successfully in world markets, 
or whether those economies became strong by opening up to trade in the 
irst place. As Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik has emphasized that a positive 
correlation between levels of trade liberalization and capita per GDP shows 
only that countries become more open as they become richer – it is not a 
simple matter of cause and effect (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 1999).
Considering the above, it is not unforeseen that individuals such as 
Uwe Hoering label recent land investments as part of “a new form of 
agrarian colonialism” (Godoy, 2009; and http://jwww.ipsnews.net/
africa/nota.asp?idnews=46557, 13/7/2009). Combined with a limited 
negotiation capacity, rapid liberalization of future Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) may thus continue to remain uninhibited by investment 
commitments. If developed nations are to remain true to the rhetoric of 
sustainable upliftment in Africa through positive exposure to international 
trade and investment, considerable attention needs to be given to the 
degree to which Africa’s institutions deal with the fair distribution of 
economic transactions.
The recent Madagascar case provides some valuable insight for analysis 
on what has gone badly awry. In 2008, Daewoo Logistics Corp, a South 
Korean irm, signed one of the most controversial foreign land acquisition 
agreements. The 99-year lease, signed by Madagascar’s then President, 
Marc Ravalomanana, secured Daewoo’s right to produce exportable food 
on 1.3 million hectares (ha) of Madagascan soil; roughly half the nation’s 
arable land. The deal sparked large scale public uprisings in subsequent 
months, which some have argued was a contributing factor to the coup led 
by Andry Rajoelina in March 2009. Despite Andry Rajoelina’s supposed 
intentions to expel Daewoo, the company continues to clandestinely hold 
some 200,000 ha of land. E.B. Kapstein’s theory on virtuous circles provides 
a general framework to investigate the Madagascan case. E.B. Kapstein 
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suggests: “It is only when countries already have an existing stock of human 
capital that they are able to reap the rewards of FDI” (Kapstein, 2002). 
Without this minimum threshold, FDI will fail to bene it the host country, 
instead providing the advantage to foreign investors. Madagascar is in fact 
a pertinent example of an underdeveloped country, lacking the minimum 
threshold requirement of human capital, which is built on skills, education, 
stock of technology and social welfare. Moreover, as outlined by K. Saggi, 
local irms can only enhance productivity and technology by “observing and 
imitating their foreign af iliates” (Saggi, 2002:209). The key challenge to 
this transfer is “reverse engineering”, often required by effectively imitating 
foreign technologies. For Madagascar, there are two notable factors that 
prevent the country from enjoying these spillovers: the agricultural system 
and technological de iciencies.  
The irst impediment to Madagascar’s “imitation” potential is the 
agricultural model used by local farmers. C. Makunike explains that 
Malagasy farming is based on labour-intensive agriculture models which 
are rudimentary, “old-fashioned and ineffective”, and while the local small-
scale farmers have “locally-relevant farming expertise, they need various 
kinds of assistance to practice successfully and improve on it” (Makunike, 
2009; and http://africanagriculture.com/search/label/Madagascar, 
6/8/2009). The foreign agricultural model, on the other hand, is predicted 
on large-scale, capital-intensive inputs, the type of agribusiness that could 
have “adverse effects on rural livelihoods” (Daniel & Mittal, 2009:24). The 
Daewoo deal focused on corn as its primary agricultural produce: while 
the plant is a staple for South Koreans, rice is the crop that dominates 
existing Malagasy farms. As C. Makunike suggests, this “dominance is 
deep-rooted and may prove hard to break” (Makunike, 2009; and http://
africanagriculture.com/search/label/Madagascar, 6/8/2009). Therefore, 
despite the possible transfers from the high-tech irm, integrating Daewoo’s 
advanced technologies into local and traditional Malagasy farms would 
be a dif icult, if not an impossible task. According to analysts, one way in 
which this problem could have been combated is if Daewoo had constructed 
nuclear farms on which thousands of Madagascan farmers were contracted. 
By doing so, agribusiness “could have been structured to have a teaching/
demonstration component to assist the [Malagasy] famers to learn new 
techniques”. However, C. Makunike observes, “these elements were 
largely missing in the way the proposed Daewoo deal was structured and 
marketed” (Makunike, 2009; and http://africanagriculture.com/search/
label/Madagascar, 6/8/2009). Thus, the Daewoo deal – if it were accepted 
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– offered little promise in terms of the demonstration channel due to the 
dif iculty in integrating two very different farming systems. 
Moreover, it is arguable that Malagasies were ill-equipped to gain from 
the imitation effect, as they lacked the skills and expertise needed to emulate 
South Korean technologies. The UNDP (United Nations Development 
Programs) education index is highly indicative of Madagascar’s condition 
in this regard. Based on data on adult literacy rates and enrolment ratios, 
countries are ranked by measures of “knowledge”. Madagascar is ranked 
at position 150 out of 177 countries (below Congo, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, 
amongst others), and has a “knowledge” score of 0.60. Less than half of 
the population (45 percent) is enrolled in primary, secondary, or tertiary 
schools, and a considerable 32.7 percent of the adult population is illiterate 
(UNDP, 2009; and http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/93.html, 
9/10/2009). These concerning igures suggest that the level of skills and 
expertise in the country are underdeveloped, particularly in comparison 
with South Korea’s superior education ranking. 
The lack of skills and knowledge in Madagascar points to a substantial 
de iciency in human capital, and thus an inability to fully use the 
technological imitation. In this light, Madagascar exempli ies B. Xhu’s inding 
that “a country needs to reach a minimum human capital threshold level in 
order to bene it from technology transfer” – a level that is rarely attained 
amongst LDCs (Xu, 2000). As Kinoshita explains, potential labour-related 
gains from FDI are realized through the “turnover” effect – when knowledge 
is transferred by the physical movement of workers; and the “training” 
effect – where local workers can acquire new skills. This hypothesised effect 
rests on the assumption that the workforce is both capable of acquiring 
these skills and that workers are offered the opportunity to do so by the 
foreign irm. Although the proposed Daewoo deal pledged to bring with 
it thousands of jobs for the Malagasy unemployed; the state of the local 
workforce meant that this promise would be severely compromised by 
socio-economic problems. 
The UNDP Human Development Index showcases Madagascar’s position 
in this regard – painting rather a distressing picture. Madagascar ranks 
143 out of a list of 177 in the UNDP index, placing it near the bottom of the 
list of ranked countries (UNDP, 2009; and http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/
indicators/93.html, 9/10/2009). Based on social and health indicators, the 
index reveals underdevelopment and widespread poverty in the country. 
The index also highlights the following statistics on Madagascar’s human 
development: an infant mortality rate of 74 per 1,000 live births; 38 percent 
of the population is undernourished; and only 50 percent has access to 
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clean drinking water. Furthermore, the probability of death before the 
age of 40 is 24.4 percent; only 34 percent of the population has access 
to improved sanitation facilities, the maternal mortality rate is 470 per 
100,000 live births, life expectancy is 58.4 years; and 85.1 percent of the 
population lives on less than $2 a day (Estandards Forum, 2008; and http://
www.estandardsforum.org/secure_content/country_pro iles/cp_110.
pdf, 10/10/2009). The igures highlight the dire economic and social 
conditions of the country; however, the real imbroglio for Madagascar is 
how these conditions translate through FDI. The poor health and social 
underdevelopment of the workforce means that Madagascar is severely 
compromised in terms of human capital. Without the required level of 
human capital, the country is unable to effectively use its training or 
turnover potential, and thus is stymied in its path to development (Xu, 
2000). 
The Madagascan case also sheds light on the role of institutions in FDI. 
Arguably, it is precisely the lack of institutional capacity that perpetuates 
a vicious rather than a virtuous circle, ensnaring infant economies in an 
underdevelopment trap. In Land grab or development opportunity?, L. Cotula 
et al. identify institutions as one of the primary causes for lost spillovers 
from FDI in developing countries (Cotula et al., 2009:7). On agricultural 
investment in Africa, the authors say that “many countries do not have in 
place [institutional] mechanisms to protect local rights and take account 
of local interests, livelihoods and welfare”. Furthermore, they claim that 
the position of the local population is critically undermined by a “lack of 
transparency and of checks and balances in contract negotiations” as well 
as “corruption and deals that do not maximise the public interest” (Cotula et 
al., 2009:7). In Madagascar, there is both a weak system of property rights 
and a notable lack of transparency within the polity. The irst problem, 
according to L. Cotula et al., is the lack of private ownership of land across 
Madagascar, and indeed across Africa at large. According to the World 
Bank estimate, “only between two and 10 percent of the land is held under 
formal tenure” (in Cotula et al., 2009:75). In lieu of an of icial system, rural 
farmers operate under a de facto or “customary” tenure system, creating a 
false sense of legitimacy and security. L. Cotula et al. caution, however, that 
“even where private ownership is formally recognized, most of the land 
is controlled by the state” (Cotula et al., 2009:75). As a result, most leases 
of land are government-allocated, like the 99-year Daewoo lease. In many 
of these deals, as in the Madagascan case, of icial monetary compensation 
for the land is negligible. For Daewoo, no rent requirement whatsoever 
was reported, promising “employment generation and infrastructure 
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development” in its place as “broader economic bene its” (Cotula et al., 
2009:78). Nevertheless, these lofty promises were brought into critical light 
when the terms of the contract were revealed, particularly Daewoo’s plans 
to bring in South African workers instead of employing local farmers. 
THE PROBLEM OF TRANSPARENCY AND CORRUPTION
The issues of transparency and corruption run parallel to the institutional 
demands of property rights and tenure systems. A. Biney writes that the lack 
of transparency and checks and balances in contract negotiations like the 
Daewoo deal compound the problems of agribusiness. He notes that “there 
are often huge gaps between what is on the statute books and the reality on 
the ground” and that “this creates a fertile ground for corruption” (Biney, 
2009; and http://www.africa iles.org/article.asp?ID=21803, 10/10/2009). 
In Madagascar, particularly during the Ravolamanana regime, most of the 
information on agribusiness projects was not made publicly available. 
Furthermore, the government was alleged to have “muf led dissent and the 
free press” (Maunganidze, 2009:3). As a result, not only was civil society 
largely excluded from agricultural investment deals, but so too were the 
people who would be directly affected by land acquisitions. 
At the time of the agreement, while local farmers struggled to acquire 
title deeds for land, “Daewoo Logistics seem[ed] to have bene ited from 
preferential treatment, allowing it quick access to the deeds”. At the 
same time, transactions between the Ravalomanana government and the 
South Korean company were made “in the greatest secrecy”; as a result, 
“suspicions arose as to the personal enrichment of a small number of high-
ranking government of icials” (Benjamin, 2009; and http://www.peuples-
solidaires.org/article920.html, 9/10/2009). Ravalomanana’s extravagant 
personal purchases did little to dispel mistrust. In 2008, the President 
bought a $60 million private jet to be used as his of icial presidential aircraft 
(Maunganidze, 2009:3). The government’s budget transparency also left 
much to be desired. One of the most contentious terms of the land deal 
– that Daewoo would incur no actual fee for the exchange – was denied 
vehemently by Ravalomanana. In light of these institutional obstacles, 
L. Cotula et al. express concern over “the weakness of provisions within 
national law for local people to steer development options and defend their 
own land rights” (Cotula et al., 2009:49). When institutions fail to provide 
the requisite security for the domestic population, foreign investment may 
create a breeding ground for resentment and social unrest.  
In order to understand the nature of this social unrest, one has to revisit 
the political development of Africa at large in order to ascertain how 
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African institutions have coped with problems of institutional development 
and modernization. For it is here that the success or failure of the recent 
phenomenon of acquiring African land rubs against the reality of African 
development. 
At independence, Africa was riddled with problems of underdevelopment 
and the call for the economic liberation of Africa was answered through 
a Socialist ideology. The leading lights were Senegal’s Léopold Senghor, 
Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Mali’s Modibo 
Keita, and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere. In Ghana, for example, Nkrumah 
set up new structures for the Trade Union Congress by making the T.U.C. 
an integral part of his political party. The General Secretary of the T.U.C. 
became a member of the party’s central committee and “the energies 
and potentialities of all workers [were] collectively directed towards the 
economic reconstruction of Ghana” (Lloyd, 1967:239). In addition, Nkrumah 
founded the Ghana Workers’ Brigade whose members were engaged in 
public works. In line with Socialist traditions, Nkrumah also called for state 
control of all industry and commerce as limited foreign exchange at the 
time was spent primarily on importing luxuries used by the elite instead 
of on more useful machinery. As such, ifty state corporations were set up 
in Ghana and many made huge losses as the bureaucrats not only had little 
aptitude for business, but also because state controls led to bribery and 
corruption, rampant red-tape, and the resultant loss of ef iciency. 
Notwithstanding the lack of ef iciency in state-led commerce and 
industry, the terminology of Marxism proved useful to Africans in 
portraying the evils of a capitalist society through symbols such as “the 
exploitation of the underdeveloped world” (Lloyd, 1967:239). Lenin’s 
organizational concepts of the party also proved to be a useful point of 
departure. In this regard, African de initions of socialism were drawn from 
the economic realities of the African states themselves, where race and 
ethnicity overlaid and complicated class and economic interpretations. In 
most cases the economies were already state-controlled as a result of the 
colonial legacy. 
The experiment in this irst wave of African socialism failed as African 
governments absorbed the means of production into the public sector. As 
Irving Markovitz avers that:
[…] the steady growth of the “public sector”, the continual expansion of government 
expenditures for administration, and the rising costs of maintaining political 
of icialdom at ever higher levels of “comfortable” living are among the most striking 
phenomena of the post independence period (Markovitz, 1977:207-208). 
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Gerard Chaliand, writing in the New York Times, put numbers to Markovitz’s 
critique. Surveying the budgets of the new African states, Chaliand revealed that 
almost half (47.2 percent) of Senegal’s budget for 1964-1965 was devoted to 
administrative salaries; not a single Dollar was spent on direct investment. The 
administration in the Cameroons absorbed more than eighteen times the money 
spent on capital expenditure. The civil service in the Central African Republic 
absorbed 81 percent of the budget. In Congo-Brazzaville, the almost 11,000 state 
employees among a population of 826,000 received 62 percent of the budget. In 
the Ivory Coast in 1964, 15,000 civil servants, less than 0.5 percent of the total 
population, absorbed 58 percent of the national budget. Dahomey took the record, 
spending 64.9 percent of its budget on civil service salaries. Between 1959 and 
1962, administrative costs rose 80 percent in Guinea, 60 percent in Mali, and a 
comparable percentage in Ghana. In December, 1974, Nigeria increased the wages 
of its civil servants by as much as 133 percent in order to “combat the effects of 
in lation” (Chaliand, 1974). 
Ruth First, writing with some heat in Power in Africa, argues that in one year, six 
times as much was spent importing alcoholic beverages as on importing fertilizer 
in the fourteen former French colonies; perfume and cosmetics absorbed half as 
much as machine tools; and ive times as much was spent on importing private cars 
as on importing agricultural equipment. She notes without amusement that:
[…] the resources of the new states were being devoured by a tiny group whose 
demands distorted the budgets and economies of the states they governed […]. The 
cost of African presidential and ministerial establishments was probably higher, 
in relation to national income, than the cost to France of the Court of Louis XIV in 
1789 (First, 1970:110).
Africa’s second historical wave had far more violent overtones. The 
general consensus places Chinese ideology at the head of this movement 
as the factional in ighting between Mao and Khruschev reached new 
heights in the skirmish to arrest the mantle of who would be the new 
spiritual leader of the international socialist movement following the 
death of Stalin. Mao had already preached his famous doctrine that 
“power came through the barrel of a gun” and volumes have been written 
on his scathing attacks on the Soviet Union’s slide into “bourgeois” 
ineffectiveness. Indeed, Kenneth Jowitt has always been convinced that 
the vitriolic relations between China and the Soviet Union at the time had 
pushed Khruschev into his crazy escapades in Cuba in order to show China 
that he could put the US “Paper Tiger” to the sword (Jowitt, 1979:134).
FRANZ FANON AND THE AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT
In African terms, Franz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral must be considered 
the intellectual leaders behind the movement to liberate Africa from 
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the remnants of colonial domination, but later in the South, Robert 
Mugabe, Samora Machel, Agostino Neto, and the leading cadres in the 
ANC’s military wing were the major exponents of the movement to free 
Africa through violent rebellion. Notwithstanding Franz Fanon’s rhetoric, 
in reality most of the sub-Saharan African countries did not have to go 
through a sustained, violent war in order to gain independence. In Ghana, 
Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania, for example, the most radical nationalist 
leaders could create a mass base of support through the use of ideology. 
Exceptions could be found in the Cameroons, where a well-organized 
guerrilla movement mounted operations against the colonial power until 
violently suppressed. In Kenya, the Mau Mau uprising, although defeated, 
forced the British to a inal political settlement and in Algeria the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) led a sustained guerrilla war against France. 
The FLN’s most celebrated intellectual, Franz Fanon, who joined the 
movement in 1955, wrote widely on the development of the liberation 
struggle. His most celebrated book, Les Damnés de la Terre, published by 
Jean-Paul Sartre, argued that the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked 
together by violence. Furthermore, his ideas on black consciousness 
later in luenced Steve Biko in South Africa and his great contribution 
to revolutionary movements in Africa was his recognition of those 
inhabitants of colonized countries who were not involved in industrial 
production, particularly peasants living outside the cities.  
In Portuguese Guinea, Amilcar Cabral attempted to create a political 
organization imbedded in a social organization that would ultimately 
enable his guerrillas to become responsible of icials. In effect he aimed 
at meeting the material needs of the moment by awakening a new 
psychological consciousness. Amilcar Cabral noted as follows:
In order to further the important task of consolidating independence and insuring 
progress, the PAIGC is organizing an extensive program for the training of cadres 
(administration, production, health, tourism, etc.) and is putting it into effect as 
far as circumstances permit. It is eager to avail itself of every possible opportunity 
to proceed as rapidly as possible with the training of a large body of personnel, 
particularly at the intermediate level, so that there will be African civil servants 
ready to go into action immediately following liberation (Cabral, 1969:44).
Notwithstanding Amilcar Cabrals’ high ideals, in general African states 
became authoritarian, highly personal structures that had territorially 
extensive but relatively limited penetrative, administrative and coercive 
capabilities. Indeed, Thomas Callaghy argued that the colonial conquest 
state was adapted to new conditions, but was never restructured. Prolonged 
and intense con lict with the colonial powers might have forged distinctive 
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and coherent revolutionary politico-military organizations capable of 
successfully undertaking socialist transformation, but the nature of the 
independence settlement was such that little actual struggle took place. 
After independence there was a general move among African states to 
turn independence movements into one-party states that could be used 
to ensure survival of the new regimes and to mobilize the population for 
socioeconomic transformation (Callaghy, 1979:116). 
Thus there remained, in Kenneth Jowitt’s terms, “a striking juxtaposition 
of rhetoric and reality within Africa” as the gap between aspirations 
and achievements were caught up in low levels of commercialization 
and industrialization, shortages of trained manpower, a lack of natural 
resources, low levels of effective state power, small national markets, 
ethnic tribal fragmentation, and weak state structures (Jowitt, 1979:134). 
Whether newly emerging nations in Africa had followed the irst wave 
of “Socialist ideology” or had formed due to the second wave of violent 
struggle against the colonial legacy, there remained a singular lack of 
success in moving beyond the initial transformation of independence to 
successful institutions of governance. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Africa is now experiencing a new wave in its history of liberation. This 
third wave is based on the economic liberation of Africa, but certainly 
draws on the experiences of the past. The crucial difference lies largely in 
the fact that rhetoric lies more closely to reality and is largely dependent 
on the vision of former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, and his inner 
circle of cadres who followed the ideals of Mbeki’s mentor Oliver Thambo. 
Mbeki sought to reorganize Africa in both economic and political terms. 
Now the question that has to be asked is whether Mbeki’s vision of a new 
Africa can deal with land acquisitions by foreign irms and governments 
given the propensity not only for unrest, but also for violence.
One hundred and twenty- ive years after the Berlin Conference, a 
vast majority of African states remain in a position of social and political 
stagnation. Decolonization, which was supposedly based on the positive-
sum incorporation of the newly-independent states into the international 
political arena, led to the dissolution of the rhetoric of “civilizing the 
barbaric masses”; and a new global endeavor emerged to “develop” the 
post-colonial state via its access to the absolute gains of the global political 
economy. For the majority of populaces of the Third World, however, 
the promises of social security, economic advancement, equal terms of 
trade, and the abandonment of force and racism did not shadow the 
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decolonization process. Returning to Franz Fanon: “there is nothing save a 
minimum of re-adaptation, a few reforms at the top, a lag waving: and down 
at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, endlessly 
marking time” (Fanon, 1963:47). 
As Sartre notes, the leader, who awakened the political consciousness of 
the people, refuses to break up the national bourgeoisie and now calls upon 
the people to become “drunk on the remembrance upon the epoch which 
led up to independence” (Sartre in Fanon, 1963:136). This paci ication 
of the people precludes the restructuring of Africa’s socio-economic and 
political way of life. Recent land acquisitions do not seem to deviate from 
this status quo. Carried out by administrative elites in partnership with 
foreign conglomerates, the transactions can occur within an institutional 
vacuum that precludes the full acknowledgement of the public interest and 
allows for the norm of self-aggrandizement to continue. 
Those who laud the new development of African agriculture based 
on foreign land acquisitions need to understand that this new scramble 
will only come at the expense of Africa’s “undivided mass”. Many African 
nations have neither the institutional capability to monitor these 
developments successfully nor do they sit well with the ideology of the 
past. Africa will still remain marginalized, raped by new colonists and an 
entire new cycle of violence can be the only outcome. 
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